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DIVORCE INVESTIGATION REPORTS IN OHIO
CHILD CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS
Ohio law formerly required preparation of divorce investigation
reports in all child custody proceedings involving children under 14
years of age. In 1971 the mandatory investigation statute was re-
placed by an Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure that made child custody
reports discretionary. After criticizing the officially stated reasons
for the change, the author turns to the evidentiary problems created
by the Ohio law governing use of extra-judicial reports at trial and
concludes that repeal of the mandatory rule was ill-advised. He pro-
poses, therefore, that the courts take full advantage of investigative
reports and give them presumptive weight.
I. INTRODUCTION
WJHEN DR. JULLIETTE DESPERT published Children of Divorce 20
years ago, her attitude toward the inept judicial treatment of
custodial determinations was one of regret and resignation.1 She
urged parents 'both to avoid court-made decisions concerning custody
of the children and to seek qualified private opinions as to alternative
procedures which could render better judgments on custody ques-
tions.2  However valid such advice, judicial determination remains
1. J. DEsPERT, CHILDREN OF DIVORCE (1953) [hereinafter cited as
DESPERT].
2. In a divorce proceeding the parties may stipulate by written agreement
who is to have custody of the children. The court is not bound by such an
agreement, but usually will defer to the parents' wishes. Bastian v. Bastian,
13 Ohio Op. 2d 267, 269, 160 N.E.2d 133, 136 (Cuyahoga County Ct. App.
1959). This child custody agreement could be the result of one of the profes-
sionally suggested private procedures.
Perhaps the best known proposal of a private method for settling the ques-
tion of child custody was made by Dr. Lawrence J. Kubie. He advocated that
a panel of psychiatrists be chosen jointly by the parents to determine the issue.
Kubie, Provisions for the Care of Children of Divorced Parents: A New Legal
Instrument, 73 YALE L.J. 1197 (1964). At least one such arbitration agree-
ment has been judicially honored. Sheets v. Sheets, 22 App. Div. 2d 176, 254
N.Y.S.2d 320 (1964).
A major problem of the Kubie proposal is its expense. The average parents
simply cannot afford the high cost of professional arbitration committees. In
addition, some important considerations in child custody decisions, such as
speed of adjudication and continuity of the child's environment, would have
to be sacrificed since gathering and organizing such a committee would take
a long time. See J. GoLDsTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 31-52 (1973) [hereinafter cited as BEYOND THE BEST
INTERESTS]; Watson, The Children of Armageddon: Problems of Custody
Following Divorce, 21 SYRACUSE L. REv. 55, 74 (1969).
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the predominant method of resolving custody disputes. Commenta-
tors, therefore, have focused their efforts on making suggestions to
upgrade the quality of the judicial custody determination 'by changing
the substantive law of custody, 3 the procedures in the courtroom,4
or even the physical structure of the courtroom.5
Despite these proposals to modernize the court custodial decision-
making process, the Ohio General Assembly has chosen to take a
step backwards by repealing Ohio Revised Code section 3105.08,
which provided for mandatory divorce investigation in cases involv-
ing children under 14 years of age. 6 Under the repealed statute the
investigation was undertaken at the request of the court or referee
3. One suggestion has been to play down the role of the biological parent
and to give the child to its "psychological" parent. Note, Committee Decision
of Child Custody Disputes and the Judicial Test of "Best Interests," 73 YALE
LJ. 1201 (1964). See also note 18 infra.
A second suggestion has been to place heavy emphasis on children's need
for "continuity." BEYOND THE BEST INTEREsrs, supra note 2. See also Foster,
Adoption and Child Custody: Best Interests of the Child?, 22 BUFFALO L.
REV. 1 (1972); Katz, Foster Parents versus Agencies: A Case Study in the
Judicial Applications of "The Best Interests of the Child," 65 MIcH L. REv.
145, 153-70 (1966); Watson, supra note 2.
4. A popular suggestion has been to provide the child with his or her own
attorney. Inker & Peretta, A Child's Right to Counsel in Custody Cases, 5
F. my L.Q. 108 (1971). Equally popular has been the suggestion to include
sociologists and social scientists in the decisionmaking process. Kubie, supra
note 2. See also Merder, The Need for an Expanded Role for the Attorney
in Divorce Counseling, 4 FAmmy L.Q. 280 (.1970); Alexander, The Family
Court-An Obstacle Race?, 19 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 609 (1958).
5. The goal of the structural changes has been to create a less formal
and adversarial atmosphere. For example, Cuyahoga County has moved the
Domestic Relations Bureau and the Domestic Relations Courts into an office
building. When a referee handles a case, an ordinary conference room is used
with an oblong table around which the parties converse. The courtrooms
themselves are small, and when court is in session, the doors are closed to en-
courage an atmosphere of privacy. For a description of the Toledo Family
Court facilities, which have also taken on an informal appearance, see VmTu,
FAMILY CASES IN COURT 183 (1956) [hereinafter cited as VIRTUE].
6. The former § 3105.08 of the Ohio Revised Code (Act of July 25,
1967, 132 Ohio Laws 970 (repealed 1971), formerly Law of May 28, 1951,
§ 8003-9, 124 Ohio Laws 185, formerly Law of February 14, 1938, 117 Ohio
Laws 807) read in part:
On the filing of a petition for divorce, annulment, alimony,
or a motion for change of custody of minor children, the court of
common pleas may, and in cases in which there are children under
fourteen years of age involved shall, cause an investigation to be
made as to the character, family relations, past conduct, earning abil-
ity, and financial worth of the parties to the action. The report of
such investigation shall be made available to either party or his coun-
sel of record upon written request not less than five days before trial.
The court, on its own motion, may cite either party to the action
from any point in the state to appear in court and testify as a witness.
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and consisted of an interview of both parents in their respective
homes by an experienced caseworker. The report of -the caseworker
was made available to the court and both parties. This procedure
was replaced by Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure 75(D) and (P)
which now make such independent judicial investigations regarding
the character, family relations, past conduct, earning ability, and fin-
ancial worth of the parties to the action wholly discretionary, regard-
less of the ages of minor children whose custody is at issue.7
This Note will examine the official acknowledgement of the need
7. Oio R. Civ. P. 75:
(D) Investigation. On the filing of a complaint for divorce, an-
nulment, or alimony, where minor children are involved, or on the
filing of a motion for change of custody of minor children, the court
may cause an investigation to be made as to the character, family
relations, past conduct, earning ability and financial worth of the par-
ties to the action. The report of such investigation shall be made
available to either party or his counsel of record upon written request
not less than seven days before trial. Such report shall be signed by
the investigator and the investigator shall be subject to cross-examina-
tion by either party concerning the contents of the report. The court
may tax as costs all or any part of the expenses for each investiga-
tion.
(P) Custody and change of custody of children. Upon hearing,
the court shall decide which of the parents shall have the care, cus-
tody and control of the children, taking into account only that which
would be for the best interests of each child. Any child over fourteen
years of age may be allowed to choose which parent it prefers to live
with, unless the court finds that the parent so selected is unfit to take
charge. Prior to hearing, the court may cause an investigation to be
made as to the character, family relations, past conduct, earning abil-
ity and financial worth of the parties to the action. The report of
such investigation shall be made available to either party or his coun-
sel of record upon written request not less than seven days before
trial. Such report shall be signed by the investigator and the investi-
gator shall be subject to cross-examination by either party concerning
the contents of the report. The court may tax as costs all or any
part of the expenses for each investigation.
Provisions permitting a child to choose the parent with whom it
desires to live shall apply also to proceedings for modification of
former orders fixing custody.
If the court finds, with respect to any child under eighteen years
of age, that neither parent is a suitable person to have custody, it may
commit the child to any other relative of the child who shall have
care, custody and control of the child. If the court, in the exercise
of its discretion, finds that the child has no relative who is a suit-
able person to have custody, it may certify the cause to the juvenile
court for further proceedings. When the court certifies the cause to
the juvenile court it shall send the juvenile court a copy of the court's
findings, together with so much of the record and such further in-
formation, in narrative form or otherwise, as it deems necessary or
as the juvenile court requests. Thereupon the juvenile court shall
have exclusive jurisdiction over the care, custody, control and support
of the child.
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for divorce investigations in Ohio and other states, the reasons given
for the repeal of the mandatory divorce investigation in Ohio, and
the evidentiary problems created by using any investigative report
at trial. The Note contends that the courts need the investigative
reports prepared by specialists in the child care field to reach in-
formed decisions on issues of child custody. It concludes with a pro-
posal designed to enable the Ohio courts to make use of their discre-
tionary powers in order to obtain and utilize such reports for the
benefit of the children concerned.
II. THE NECESSITY FOR SPECIALIZED COURT ASSISTANCE
The need for some type of specialized court assistance in divorce
cases has 'been recognized in Ohio for nearly half a century.8 As
early as 1925, the Toledo Family Court borrowed probation officers
from the juvenile court to gather information to aid in custody deter-
minations. 9 In 1938 the use of investigators was statutorily recog-
nized in Ohio to be within the discretion of the trial court. 10 The
Toledo Family Court went so far as to establish a special department
to carry on such investigations, although not required to do so by
statute.". When divorce investigations were made mandatory in
cases involving children under 14 years of age in 1951,12 ",the sta-
tute [did] little more than express in legislative enactment proce-
dures which [had] been common practice in several of the family
courts for a number of years."' 3 -In 1971 Ohio reverted to discre-
tionary divorce investigation. Some counties ignored the legislative
change and continued ordering divorce investigations where minor
8. VmTUE 182.
9. Id. at 195. In 1931, seven years before the Ohio General Assembly
codified divorce investigation procedures, the Cuyahoga County Court of Ap-
peals became the first Ohio court to note in a reported decision the "very valu-
able service which is now recognized as being rendered by the Domestic Rela-
tions Bureau." The court deemed the information so gathered to be "of in-
valuable help to the trial judge in aiding him to reach a just and correct con-
clusion as to the disposition of the various cases." Mahoney v. Mahoney, 9
Ohio L. Abs. 434, 435 (Cuyahoga County Ct. App. 1931).
The court commented further that "almost as a matter of necessity, the
trial judge in charge of [domestic relations] cases is bound to unburden him-
self somewhat of the detail entailed in the determination of those cases." Id.
at 435.
10. Law of February 14, 1938, 117 Ohio Laws 807.
11. VIRTUE 195-96.
12. Law of May 28, 1951, § 8003-9, 124 Ohio Laws 185, formerly Law
of February 14, 1938, 117 Ohio Laws 807. Now, see Omo R. Civ. P.
75(D), (P).
13. VITUE 177.
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children were involved. 14 In other counties 'the investigations are
now initiated by motions of litigants and referrals by judges and re-
ferees of their own volition.' 5
Ohio has not 'been alone in using extra-judicial investigative
workers to provide information for family court judges. Minnesota's
family courts regularly borrow social workers from the county wel-
fare department in custody cases. 16 The Superior Court of New Jer-
sey in the recent case of In re P,17 after lengthy consideration of
psychiatric and sociological reports, abandoned the traditional "rule-
of-thumb" approach that would have given custody to the biological
parents absent a showing of their "unfitness," and instead allowed
the child's psychological parents to retain custody.' 8 In general, the
courts of most states have looked favorably upon the use of some
form of extra-judicial service in family courts where the custody of
minor children must be decided.' 9
14. Interview with Henry L. Williams, Chief Investigator of the Domestic
Relations Bureau of Cuyahoga County, in Cleveland, Ohio, July 21, 1973
[hereinafter cited as Williams Interview].
15. Id. Mr. Williams revealed that although mandatory investigations
were no longer required by statute, his department remains overburdened with
requests for home investigations in connection with custody cases.
16. See, e.g., Gumphrey v. Gumphrey, 262 Minn. 515, 115 N.W.2d 353
(1962). For an Ohio approval of Minnesota's nonadversary approach, see
Woodruff v. Woodruff, 36 Ohio Op. 2d 165, 217 N.E.2d 264 (C.P. Miami
County 1965).
Commenting upon the Minnesota system, Judge Edward F. Waite wrote
that "the assistance of expert social workers is always useful and often essential
to any assurance of wise action." Waite, Children of Divorce in Minnesota:
Between the Millstones, 32 MnqN. L. REv. 766, 768 (1948).
17. 114 N.J. Super. 584, 277 A.2d 566 (App. Div. 1971).
18. For analysis of the differences between biological parents and psychol-
ogical parents, see BEYOND THE BEsT INTEREmTS, supra note 2, at 16-20. See
also Martire & McCandless, Psychological Aspects of the Adoption Process,
40 IowA L. REv. 350, 354 (1955); Comment, Adoption: Psychological Parent-
hood as the Controlling Factor in Determining the Best Interests of the Child,
26 RuTGERs L. REV. 693 (1973); Note, Alternatives to "Parental Right" in
Child Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties, 73 YALE hJ. 151 (1963).
Courts occasionally choose to ignore expert opinion and provide their own "ex-
pertise." See, e.g., Woodruff v. Woodruff, 36 Ohio Op. 2d 165, 217 N.E.2d
264 (C.P. Miami County 1965).
19. See, e.g., New York: Gluckstern v. Gluckstern, 2 App. Div. 2d 744,
153 N.Y.S.2d 184 (1956), remanded, 17 Misc. 2d 83, 158 N.Y.S.2d 504 (Sup.
Ct.), af'd with no opinion, 3 App. Div. 2d 999, 165 N.Y.S.2d 432, afj'd per
curiam, 4 N.Y.2d 521, 176 N.Y.S.2d 352, 151 N.E.2d 897 (1958); California:
CAL. CODE Civ. PRO. § 263 (West 1967); UNiFoRM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
ACT § 405, to date adopted by three states (Arizona, Colorado, and Ken-
tucky), which provides:
(a) In contested custody proceedings, and in other custody pro-
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ceedings if a parent or the child's custodian so requests, the court may
order an investigation and report concerning custodial arrangements
for the child. The investigation and report may be made by
[the court social service agency, the staff of the juvenile court, the
local probation or welfare department, or a private agency employed
by the court for the purpose].
(b) In preparing his report concerning a child, the investigator
may consult any person who may have information about the child
and his potential custodial arrangements. Upon order of the court,
the investigator may refer the child to professional personnel for di-
agnosis. The investigator may consult with and obtain information
from medical, psychiatric, or other expert persons who have served
the child in the past without obtaining the consent of the parent or
the child's custodian; but the child's consent must be obtained if he
has reached the age of 16, unless the court finds that he lacks mental
capacity to consent. If the requirements of subsection (c) are ful-
filled, the investigator's report may be received in evidence at the
hearing.
(c) The court shall mail the investigator's report to counsel and
to any party not represented by counsel at least 10 days prior to the
hearing. The investigator shall make available to counsel and to any
party not represented by counsel the investigator's file of underlying
data, and reports, complete texts of diagnostic reports made to the
investigator pursuant to the provisions of subsection (b), and the
names and addresses of all persons whom the investigator has con-
sulted. Any party to the proceeding may call the investigator and
any person whom he has consulted for cross-examination. A party
may not waive his right of cross-examination prior to the hearing.
See also 2 H. FoSTER & D. FaEn, DIssOLUnON OF THE FAMILY UNrr, LAw
AND THE FAMLY IN NEW YoRK § 29:30 (1966).
Michigan has made use of behavioral scientists' knowledge, but instead of
incorporating that information into a report on each custody case, it has set
out in the Michigan Child Custody Act of 1970, MicH. CoMP. LAws ANN.
§ 722.23 (Supp. 1974), 10 factors that are to be taken into account in deter-
mining what will serve the child's "best interests":
Sec. 3. "Best interests of the child" means the sum total of the
following factors to be considered, evaluated and determined by the
court:
(a) The love, affection and other emotional ties existing
between the competing parties and the child.
(b) The capacity and disposition of competing parties to
give the child love, affection and guidance and continuation of
the educating and raising of the child in its religion or creed,
if any.
(c) The capacity and disposition of competing parties to
provide the child with food, clothing, medical care or other re-
medial care recognized and permitted under the laws of this
state in lieu of medical care, and other material needs.
(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, sat-
isfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining contin-
uity.
(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or
proposed custodial home.
(f) The moral fitness of the competing parties.
(g) The mental and physical health of the competing par-
ties.
(h) The home, school and community record of the child.
(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court
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I[. OFFICIAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE
ELIMINATION OF MANDATORY
DIVORCE INVESTIGATIONS IN OHIO
In the face of this growing assent -to the value of extra-judicial
investigations, Ohio's return2 to discretionary divorce reports indi-
cates dissatisfaction with the investigation procedure itself.21 The
Staff Notes accompanying this change, effectuated ,by rules 75(D)
and (P), set forth the reasons for the reversal.2 2
The Staff Notes maintain that "[e]xperience has shown [that the
mandatory divorce investigation] has little value in most cases since
deems the child to be of sufficient age to express preference.
(j) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant
to a particular child custody dispute.
Some commentators are uncertain whether judges have the ability to imple-
ment such standards:
However, in our judgment, "best interests of the child," even when
defined by meaningful standards, remains a sufficiently elusive con-
cept to tax to the utmost the ability of the courts to decide these cases
correctly. We believe this suggests development of innovative pro-
grams designed to maximize the chances of all pertinent information
being considered and appropriately evaluated as well.
Benedek & Benedek, New Child Custody Laws: Making Them Do What They
Say, 42 AM. J. oF ORTHOPSYcHIATRY 825, 834 (1972).
20. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
21. Some of the impetus for repealing the mandatory divorce investigation
can be attributed to the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Rolls v. Rolls, 9
Ohio St. 2d 59, 223 N.E.2d 604 (1967), which held that the carrying out of
such an investigation was not a jurisdictional prerequisite to hearing a divorce
petition. This apparently created some-confusion in the state legislature as to
the validity of any "mandatory" requirement.
22. The Staff Note to Rule 75(D), in 1 S. JACOBY, OHio Cvu PRAcricE
483 (1971):
Rule 75(D) is similar to Section 3105.08, R.C., and concerns investi-
gations when minor children are involved. The rule changes the stat-
ute's mandatory investigation requirement. This mandatory investi-
gation has caused much expense and delay in many courts. Experi-
ence has shown it has little value in most cases since the custody
question is generally amicably settled. The rule further changes the
statute by making the investigator sign his report and subjecting him
to cross-examination. Finally, the rule allows a court to tax all the
expenses of the investigation as costs.
These changes are all designed to make the investigation mean-
ingful and thorough. In most cases investigations are not needed;
the parties have agreed on the custody question. However, if it
comes to the court's attention in a particular case that one party or
both parties may be unfit to have custody the court may order an in-
vestigation. The investigator, knowing that he may be cross-exam-
ined will do a thorough job and the court can require he do a com-
plete investigation because the expenses of the investigation may be
charged as costs. Thus investigations will be used only when neces-
sary and will fulfill their function of child protection and not act as
an inordinate delaying factor.
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the custody question is generally amicably settled." -2 3  The fact that
most divorces in Ohio are uncontested 24 and accompanied by "ami-
cable" custody settlements was the very reason that the Director of
the Department of Domestic Relations in Cuyahoga County gave for
the statutory institution of the mandatory divorce investigation
in 1951:
In most uncontested cases, any information which would
cast a doubt upon the fitness of the plaintiff to have cus-
tody of the children is not made available to the court by
the plaintiff and, since -the defendant is not present, never
comes to the court's attention.25
Judges and psychiatrists recognize that the amicability of a cus-
tody agreement is no measure of its wisdom. On the contrary, ami-
cable settlements all too often 'bring forward the wishes of only one
party and effectively conceal information without which the court
cannot fulfill its duty of looking after the best interests of the child-
ren. 26 Judge Waite 'has expressed the opinion that the uncontested
divorce creates the greatest danger to the child's best interest: "Often
the . . . disposition of the children [was] covered by undisclosed
agreements ,between the parties. . . . The good judgment and con-
science of the plaintiff and counsel were the only safeguard of the
children's interests, and - to put it mildly - were not always ade-
quate."' 27 In discussing uncontested divorces, Dr. Despert outlined
one of the psychological forces that produces results adverse to the
child's interest in spite of the facade of agreement. "One wife sin-
23. Id.
24. For example, of the .10,359 divorce complaints disposed of during 1973
in Cuyahoga County, 6,823 were uncontested. 1973 REPORT OF CUYAHOGA
COUNTY DIVORCE COURT.
25. Brooks, Mandatory Investigations in Divorce Cases, 24 OHIo BAR 581
(1951).
26. In apparent recognition of these dangers, Wisconsin law specifically
provides that divorces are not to be brought to trial until the court's family
services have undertaken to deal with the social and psychological conflicts
that inevitably attend divorce actions. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 247.081(2) (Supp.
1974).
27. Waite, supra note 16, at 774. Judge Waite commented further:
Often the children were committed to the custody of unfit persons in
ignorance of the real facts; often a change of circumstances, such as
remarriage of one of the parents, led to an application for change of
custody, and then the luckless children, caught between the upper and
nether millstones of bitter controversy, needed protection from the
court which the judge was not equipped to give. . . . It can hardly
be emphasized too much that default cases, where the dangers we are
considering are most likely to threaten, make up an overwhelming
proportion of all divorces.
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cerely believes that the less the children see of -their father the better.
How can she believe otherwise, 'when at this moment she sees the
man who was her husband only as a heartless creature who has aban-
doned her for another woman?" 23
A second reason stated in the Staff Notes for rendering divorce
investigations discretionary was -the avoidance of delay.29 It is diffi-
cult to see, however, how delay is a problem. Rule 75(K)30 provides
for a 6-week cooling off period between service of process and the di-
vorce hearing. Given this interim, no delay occurs at all unless the in-
vestigation takes longer than 6 weeks. In Cuyahoga County, where
approximately 10,000 divorce petitions are filed every year,31 a cus-
tody investigation presently takes from 6 to 8 weeks.. 2 Thus, the de-
lay is at most 2 weeks. In addition, according to the Chief Investi-
gator for Cuyahoga County, if the investigation staff were returned to
its pre-1971 size of 15 from its present size of 6, 33 investigations could
be easily completed within the 6-week period.34
Even if the divorce investigations did cause delay and if saving
time were of sufficient importance to abandon mandatory investi-
gations, such abandonment would -ultimately increase the burden on
the courts. A greater number of modification attempts is sure to
be produced 'by hastily approved custody decisions than by those
considered carefully in the light of full information about the fami-
lial situation.35 When a motion for modification does occur, the court
28. DESPERT 196.
29. See note 22 supra.
30. Omio R. Crv. P. 75(K):
No action for divorce, annulment or alimony may be heard and
decided until the expiration of forty-two days after the service of
process or twenty-eight days after the last publication of notice upon
the complaint; nor shall any such action be heard and decided earlier
than twenty-eight days after the service of a counterclaim, which un-
der this rule may be designated a cross-complaint, unless the plaintiff
files a written waiver of such twenty-eight day period.
The purpose of this built-in delay is to promote reconciliation. The Toledo
courts, for example, offer conciliation services during this 6-week period.
Foster, Conciliation and Counseling in the Courts in Family Law Cases, 41
N.Y.U.L. Rav. 353, 356 (1966).
31. In 1973, for example, 10,438 divorce complaints were filed. 1973 RE-
PORT OF CUYAHoGA COUNT DivoRcE COURT.
32. Williams Interview, supra note 14.
33. A reduction of the staff was undertaken pursuant to the erroneous as-
sumption that the repeal of mandatory divorce investigations would result in
fewer requests for investigations. See note 15 supra.
34. Williams Interview, supra note 14.
35. In Ohio the rule has been well established that a motion for modifica-
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that initially determined the custody question will not be able to rec-
tify its hasty decision without finally resorting to an independent in-
vestigation. Thus, what could have been accomplished in the di-
vorce proceeding will merely have been delayed.
The third justification put forth in the Staff Notes for the elimina-
tion of the mandatory investigation was the avoidance of unnecessary
court expense.3 6 The issue was first raised by the prosecuting attor-
ney of Clermont County in 1951, immediately after divorce investi-
gations were made mandatory. In reply to his inquiry regarding who
should bear the expense of the then newly inaugurated mandatory
investigation procedures, the Ohio Attorney General issued a formal
opinion3' to the effect that parties to a lawsuit could not be charged
with internal court costs for particular services without express statu-
tory authorization. 38 Since Rule 75, in 'both paragraphs (D) and
(P), provides just such authorization, the argument that mandatory
investigations are too expensive loses much of its force.39 Whenever
a court finds that litigants can share in the expense of the investi-
gations, it will be within its power to have them do so.
In situations where parties cannot afford to make meaningful
contributions toward allaying the expense of divorce investigations,
the state should assume the costs so incurred. This potential in-
crease in state expenditure can be justified in two ways. First, from
a sociological standpoint, any procedure that helps courts make more
tion of child custody will not be granted "unless such action is warranted by
a change in conditions or by the discovery of material facts existent at the
time of the previous order and then unknown to the court." Dailey v. Dailey,
146 Ohio St. 93, 95, 64 N.E.2d 246, 247 (1945). See Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpat-
rick, 4 Ohio App. 2d 279, 207 N.E.2d 794 (1965); Kelly v. Kelly, 68 Ohio
L. Abs. 212, 212 N.E. 690 (C.P. Lucas County 1951).. The use of divorce
investigation reports should substantially reduce the number of motions for
modification. A well researched report would guarantee that there were no
"material facts" left unpresented to the trial court. In addition competent in-
vestigators should be able, at least to some extent, to anticipate certain changes
in the family situation by analysis of the observable personality traits of the
parents.
36. Note 22 supra.
37. 1951 Op. Omo Ar'y GEN. 723.
38. Accord, Euclid v. Vogelin, 152 Ohio St. 538, 90 N.E.2d 593 (1950).
See also Smith v. Smith, 93 Ohio App. 294, 114 N.E.2d 480 (1952), where
it was further noted that payment of such expenses "may be made upon the
warrant of the county auditor upon the proper certificate of the Common Pleas
judge allowing the claim." Id. at 299, 114 N.E.2d at 482.
39. Paragraphs (D) and (P) of Omo R. Civ. P. 75 provide: "The court
may tax as costs all or any part of the expenses for each investigation." Omo
REv. CODE § 3109.04(A) (47 OHIo BAR 1060 (Sept. 16, 1974)) also contains
the same language in an amendment effective Sept. 30, 1974.
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informed decisions 'benefits society by mitigating the disruptive ef-
fects of divorces. 40 Indeed, it can be argued that the gains to society
attributable to more informed child custody decisions and the savings
to the courts resulting from a reduction in -the number of modi-
fication proceedings, 41 would indirectly pay for the added expense
of mandatory investigations.
Secondly, -pragmatic considerations also call for the state to help
finance divorce investigations. If a litigant is compelled to pay for
experts at the outset, he or she will have good reason to hire his
or her own expert. Thus, in the name of saving expense, the new
rule may cause litigants to attempt to protect themselves by incurring
more expense.
IV. THE EVIDENTIARY STATUS OF DIVORCE
INVESTIGATION REPORTS
Although the three reasons set forth in the Staff Notes do not
adequately support Ohio's change from mandatory to discretionary
divorce investigations, the confusion in the courts over the eviden-
tiary status of investigation reports may in part explain the switch.
However, if the purpose of the General Assembly was to eliminate
this confusion, it would have abolished all divorce investigations.
Since it permitted continued use of discretionary investigations, seri-
ous evidentiary problems remain, which the Staff Notes conspicu-
ously failed to address.
Extra-judicial divorce investigation reports have produced two
evidentiary problems 'with which Ohio courts have struggled for 40
years. First, the reports often contain hearsay and double-hearsay
ostensibly rendering their contents inadmissible. 42  Secondly, even if
40. A similar view was taken in Smith v. Smith, 93 Ohio App. 294, 114
N.E.2d 480 (1952), where the court noted that the "Legislature in requiring
an independent investigation under the direction of the court might well have
conceived and intended it to be primarily for the benefit of society and the
public . . . [and that] the paramount duty of the court [is] to consider and
provide for the welfare of the children involved." Id. at 298, 114 N.E.2d at
481.
41. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
42. Ohio courts offer the traditional reasons for applying the hearsay
rule: to avoid the introduction of testimony on which cross-examination is im-
possible and the reliability of which is attenuated by its secondhand nature.
Potter v. Baker, 162 Ohio St. 488, 494, 124 N.E.2d 140, 144 (1955). Of
course the availability of the caseworker for cross-examination will not obviate
the unavailability for cross-examination of any of the declarants of the internal
hearsay (the persons who are interviewed by the worker) that the investigation
report contains. On the other hand, there is a class of hearsay declarants
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the hearsay rule is applied to exclude the report from the trial record,
the trial judge is, nevertheless, permitted to familiarize himself with
the report, hearsay and all. A litigant is thus robbed of the oppor-
tunity to attack the hearsay, while the trial court may 'be perma-
nently prejudiced by the evidence.
This conflict is the direct result of adherence to Ohio Revised
Code section 2317.3943 and Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 75(D) .4 4
whose availability for cross-examination or in camera discussion with the judge
or referee is relatively predictable: those members of the child's family who
have been interviewed by the caseworker. Thus, where the statements of mem-
bers of the immediate family are transcribed or commented upon by the case-
worker, their theoretical unavailability for cross-examination is not an applica-
ble rationale for excluding the testimony. In reality the immediate family,
usually the mother and father and perhaps brothers and sisters of the child
whose custody is at issue, will be available for cross-examination if the court
or one of the parties requires their presence. Moreover, with regard to an in-
terview with the child, there is a question whether his statement to the case-
worker is hearsay at all. Such a statement, even when it describes the activ-
ities of the parents, may serve not as evidence of the truth of the statement
but to illustrate the child's perception of his environment and to indicate
whether the child is content in it. The applicability of the second rationale,
that of the reliability of the relator of the hearsay, is also questionable because
the party who is relating the hearsay is the caseworker. A professional having
no interest in the litigation other than to present a view of the home will in
most cases be a sufficiently reliable source of the out-of-court statements. See
Note, Use of Extra-Record Information in Custody Cases, 24 U. Cm. L. Rnv.
349, 357 (1957).
The courts could distinguish among the classes of hearsay declarants whose
statements are recorded in the investigation reports by excluding those state-
ments taken from members of the community who are not as a general rule
readily available for cross-examination (see Swigart v. Swigart, 65 Ohio L.
Abs. 582, 115 N.E.2d 871 (Montgomery County Ct. App. 1953)), while ad-
mitting those statements of the immediate family of the child whose custody
is at stake.
43. OHIo RPv. CODE ANN. § 2317.39 (Page 1954):
Whenever an investigation into the facts of any case, civil or
criminal, pending at the time of such investigation of any court, is
made, conducted, or participated in, directly or indirectly, by any
court or any department thereof, through public employees, paid pri-
vate investigators, social workers, friends of the court, or any other
persons and a report of such investigation is prepared for submission
to the court, the contents of such report shall not be considered by
any judge of the court wherein such case is pending either before the
trial of the case or at any stage of the proceedings prior to final dis-
position thereof, unless the full contents of such report have been
made readily available and accessible to all parties to the case or their
counsel. The parties or their counsel shall be notified in writing of
the fact that an investigation has been made, that a report has been
submitted, and that the contents of the report are available for exam-
ination. Such notice shall be given at least five days prior to the time
the contents of any report are to be considered by any judge of the
court wherein the case is pending. In the event that a report follow-
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The code section authorizes pretrial "familiarization" by the court
with the report regardless of its admissibility, provided the parties
are notified that the report is available 5 days before the judge "con-
siders" the report. Rule 75(D) similarly makes no mention of ad-
missibility, but requires that the report be made available to the par-
ties upon written request 7 days before trial. The -rule leaves unan-
swered two questions regarding what a court may do with the report:
(1) if the rule is complied with, is the report admissible, and (2)
if the rule is not complied with, is the report legally non-existent?
Both Ohio Revised Code section 2317.39 and rule 75(D) ac-
cordingly render "available" to the court materials that might other-
wise be inadmissible and thus totally unavailable to the court. Prob-
lems arise, however, when a report is inadmissible from an eviden-
tiary standpoint but nonetheless available to the court under the
authorization of either of the above provisions. The court is then
torn between upholding availability on the grounds that all pertinent
information should be considered by the court in ascertaining the
child's best interest, and upholding inadmissibility on the grounds
that the evidentiary system should not be compromised. The ad-
herence of the Ohio courts to the traditional notion of evidence being
either "in" or "out" has prevented the striking of a balance between
these two apparently competing interests.
The Ohio General Assembly made its first attempt to resolve this
conflict in 1938 when it enacted General Code section 11979-445
providing for discretionary divorce investigations. The compromise
offered by this provision was the creation of a new evidentiary status
bag any investigation is prepared for submission orally, such oral re-
port shall be reduced to writing prior to the issuance of notice of the
availability of such report for examination.
This section does not apply only to the utilization of the contents
of such reports as testimony, but shall prevent any judge from famil-
iarizing himself with such contents in any manner unless this sec-
tion has been fully complied with.
44. See note 7 supra.
45. Law of February 14, 1938, 117 Ohio Laws 807, as amended and re-
codified, Law of May 28, 1951, § 8003-9, 124 Ohio Laws 185, as amended
and recodified, Act of July 25, 1967, § 3105.08, 132 Ohio Laws 970 (repealed
1971):
On the filing of a petition in divorce or for alimony, the court, in
its discretion, may appoint one of its officers to make an investigation
as to the character, family relations, past conduct, earning ability, and
financial worth of the parties to the action, and if the report of
said investigation is filed in the case before trial, may be consid-
ered as evidence in the case, subject to the right of either party to
cross-examine the party making the investigation.
The court on its own motion, may cite either party to the action
from any point in the state to appear in court and testify as a witness
(emphasis added).
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somewhere between admissible and inadmissible. Two restrictions
were imposed on the introduction of investigation reports into evi-
dence: (1) that -the report -must be filed before trial, and (2) that
either party may cross-examine the investigator whose report was be-
ing submitted. The statute made clear that such admissibility was
discretionary even if both conditions were met. Thus, the rule was
born that a divorce investigation report could be admitted into evi-
dence regardless of the generally applicable formal evidentiary rules,
provided both prerequisites were satisfied. Nevertheless, if the court
so chose, the filed report might be placed in limbo, available to all
parties and the judge, but not admitted formally, even though both
prerequisites had been fulfilled.
The problem was perhaps oversimplified in Welge v. Welge46 in
which the court offered a concise solution. In dictum, the opinion
stated that the trial court could only consider "evidence" and that
if the investigator's report did not have that status, the appellate
court would be similarly precluded from assuming the existence of
such a report. Neither statutory requirement was fulfilled in Welge.
The report had not been filed -before trial, and the -investigator was
not made available for cross-examination. Thus the report was in-
admissible under General Code section 11979-4 but the availability
of the report was left undecided. It was upon these facts that the
court eliminated the quasi-admissible status of investigation reports.
Arguably, the court's hard line on the evidence question might have
been considerably less harsh in the face of a "more admissible" re-
port (for example, if the investigator -had been available for cross-
examination though the report had not been filed properly before
trial). Nevertheless, it would have placed the court in an uncom-
fortable position to verbalize the evidentiary status of investigators'
reports in terms of "degrees of admissibility" and, in effect, admit
the failings of the traditional evidentiary rules as applied to investiga-
tion reports, especially where a strict construction of the statute
would have enabled the court to avoid the issue legitimately.
A year after the Welge case was decided, the Ohio General As-
sembly enacted Ohio Revised Code section 2317.39 and section
3105.08, the recently repealed statute, thereby perpetuating the
courts' evidentiary difficulties. Section 2317.39 imposed procedural
restrictions on the availability as well as the admissibility of extra-
judicial reports: "This section does not apply only to the utilization
of the contents of such reports as -testimony, but shall prevent any
judge from familiarizing himself with such contents in any manner
46. 87 Ohio App. 93, 94 N.E.2d 208 (,1950).
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unless this section has been fully complied with."'47 The legislature
thus recognized the evidentiary status that investigation reports had
occupied and attempted to bolster due process protections in the face
of such extra-judicial "familiarizations." The specific protection af-
forded was that of requiring the parties to be notified of the report's
existence 5 days before the judge familiarized himself with the
report.48
Concurrently, Ohio Revised Code section 3105.08 replaced
General Code section 11979-4 and rendered divorce investigations
mandatory. Under the new statute the reports were to be made avail-
able to either party not -less than 5 days before trial. In addition, two
other changes were made: (1) the cross-examination requirement
was removed as a prerequisite to admissibility, and (2) the language
stating that the reports "may be considered as evidence" was de-
leted.49 The latter deletion might have been construed to imply that
the normal rules of evidence did not apply to investigation reports
and that the use of the report at trial depended only upon the 5
day notice requirement. The omission, however, was taken to imply
the reverse, that absent any mention of admissibility the normal rules
of evidence applied -with the added notice requirement acting as an
extra protection for the parties.50 The deletion of the cross-examina-
tion requirement was cited as further evidence of the General Assem-
bly's intent to put investigation reports back into the realm of normal
evidentiary rules. 51
As of 1951, then, a litigant could still object to the introduction
of a report into evidence, relying on the rules of evidence. His ob-
jection could be sustained by the very judge who had previously
familiarized himself with the inadmissible evidence.
The case of McQueary v. McQueary12 continued, in dictum, the
strict application of the rules of evidence first enunciated in Welge
and inferred from section 3105.08. 53 The opinion would have a
47. See note 43 supra.
48. Id.
49. Compare Ohio Revised Code § 3105.08 (see note 6 supra) with
General Code § 11979-4 (see note 45 supra).
50. Beamer v. Beamer, 17 Ohio App. 2d 90, 91-92, 244 N.E.2d 775, 777
(1969).
51. Id. The reverse also could have been inferred by reading the abolition
of the cross-examination requirement as a legislative indication that custody
hearings were deemed informal. See text accompanying notes 72-73 infra.
52. 29 Ohio Op. 2d 24, 200 N.E.2d 722 (C.P. Monroe County 1964).
53. The holding of the case was that "the [divorce] investigator can keep
secret the identity and comments of his informants if there is no hearsay in
the record before the court" Id. at 28, 200 N.E.2d at 727. Since a divorce
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court delete from the report and from the court's memory hearsay
and opinions based on hearsay if the report is to be introduced into
the record, 54 but it would also have the court keep the report in the-
forefront of its considerations in protecting the welfare of the child.55
The McQueary court recognized the inherent difficulty in following
such an order.55 To expunge the influence of hearsay from a report
and still to consider the report based so heavily on that hearsay ap-
pears to be an impossible task. Nevertheless, the court rationalized
the rule 'by relying on the theory that the other evidence admitted
to the record would, in most instances, support the decision of the
court in any event. Thus a court is told to base its decision on the
record, but to use as background other information based on hearsay.
The inadequacy of the record in uncontested divorce cases has al-
ready ,been commented upon.5 7 There is little reason to believe that
it would 'be substantially better in contested cases.58 Thus, to rely
on the official court records, even in contested cases, is to ignore a
major reason for instituting divorce investigation, namely to bring to
the court information kept out of the record by litigants.
The effect of the McQueary decision was intensified by the gen-
eral rule of appellate review adopted by the Seneca County Court
of Appeals in Beamer v. Beamer.5 9 There the court was faced with
a trial judge who refused to act in accordance with the makeshift
procedural safeguards provided in section 2317.39 and who actually
introduced into evidence what he had read in an investigation report
made available to the parties under section 2317.39. The appellate
court first ruled that the investigation report could not attain eviden-
tiary status without the parties' consent. 0° But in the absence of con-
investigation report could only be admitted into evidence if it contained no
hearsay, the investigator would never have to reveal his sources.
54. Id. at 27-28, 200 N.E.2d at 726-27.
55. Id. at 27, 200 N.E.2d at 725.
56. Id. at 28, 200 N.E.2d at 727.
57. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
58. "In non-contested divorce cases the evidence which the one party
chooses to present is often quite limited, and in contested cases is often highly
influenced by emotional factors. To enable the court to determine what best
serves the interests of the children it may . . . acquire additional information
from any source independent of either of the parties in the action." Beamer
v. Beamer, 17 Ohio App. 2d 89, 91, 244 N.E.2d 775, 777 (1969).
59. 17 Ohio App. 2d 89, 244 N.E.2d 775 (1969).
60. Id. at 95-96, 244 N.E.2d at 779-80. The court cites as support for
this proposition the two cases of Mahoney v. Mahoney, 9 Ohio L. Abs. 434
(Cuyahoga County Ct. App. 1931), and Holland v. Holland, 49 Ohio L. Abs.
237, 75 N.E.2d 489 (Cuyahoga County Ct. App. 1947). Like Beamer, both
cases involve motions to modify previous custody orders. However, at the time
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sent and faced with the problem of the report having been admitted
into evidence, the court set forth the following standard for deter-
mining whether admission of an investigation report constituted re-
versible error:
(a) the error [of putting the report into evidence] was
not prejudicial where the evidence received in open court
was sufficient to sustain -the order and findings, and
(b) the error was prejudicial where there was not other
evidence in the record to sustain the order.('
Thus, as in McQueary, the court increases the importance of the
record, which it had assailed as being inadequate in both uncontested
and contested divorce cases.6 2 Only the record can control the fate
of minor children once a report is erroneously admitted into evi-
dence. If by some chance the parties -have not presented other evi-
dence which would lead to the same conclusion as the inadvertently
admitted report, then the report constitutes prejudicial error. But
if the parties have come forth with their own evidence and such evi-
dence is reflected by the decree, then the report is deemed utterly
inconsequential.
One decision that stands out among the Ohio cases in this area
is Woodruff v. Woodruff.63  There the court simply decided not
to apply the "strict rules of evidence" at a custodial hearing, but to
allow into evidence any relevant information regardless of formal ad-
missibility. The trial court was thus free to reach its decision on
the basis of a careful, open consideration of all available information.
The only limitation on this freedom was that a custody award could
not be based exclusively on what would otherwise be considered in-
of the Mahoney decision there was no statutory law governing divorce investi-
gations. Holland was decided under the section of the General Code which
only allowed discretionary investigations "[o]n the filing of a petition in divorce
or for alimony... "' See note 45 supra. This is to be contrasted with the
law in effect at the time of the Beamer decision. Under § 3105.08 di-
vorce investigations were allowed "on the filing of a petition for divorce, annul-
ment, alimony, or a motion for change of custody. .. ." Note 6 supra. Ma-
honey and Holland can be interpreted, then, as holding that the parties must
consent in a custody modification proceeding in order for the investigation to
be undertaken, regardless of the report's potential evidentiary status. Beamer,
on the other hand, uses the consent requirement as a prerequisite to the in-
vestigation report's admissibility into evidence since the statute clearly author-
izes the investigation itself. This distinction is significant because the consent
obstacle to admissibility was mandated neither by case law nor by statute. See
text accompanying note 51 supra.
61. 17 Ohio App. 2d at 96, 244 N.E.2d at 780.
62. Id. at 91, 244 N.E.2d at 777.
63. 36 Ohio Op. 2d 165, 217 N.E.2d 264 (C.P. Miami County 1965).
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admissible evidence. 64 This is the logical solution to the quandary
in which trial court judges find themselves when, on the one hand,
they are allowed to read the report, but, on the other hand, they
must exclude the report as evidence. This approach also preserves
in the record all the information considered by the trial court in
reaching its decision. In the event of appeal, the appellate court
is able to view all relevant information, including hearsay, in its ef-
fort to protect the interests of the child.65
The enlightened approach of the Woodruff court appears to be
consistent with the relevant statutory law. Although both section
2317.3966 and Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 75(D) apply generally
to the use of extra-judicial reports 'by the courts, the latter governs
the divorce situation wherever these two provisions conflict. 67 Under
traditional rules of statutory construction, a provision that speaks
specifically to a given problem controls over a statute that applies
in a more general sense.68 Since section 2317.39 is relevant to any
extra-judicial report in any civil or criminal case, 69 and rule 75(D)
applies specifically to divorce investigation reports, 70 this canon of
construction indicates that the latter provision exclusively applies in
64. Id. at 169, 217 N.E.2d at 269.
65. This approach is also consistent with the general rule of appellate re-
view announced in Beamer v. Beamer, 17 Ohio App. 2d 90, 96, 244 N.E.2d
775, 780 (1969). See text accompanying note 61 supra.
66. See note 43 supra.
67. There appear to be only two sources of potential conflict between these
provisions. The first is that rule 75(D) requires investigation reports to be
made available to both parties not less than 7 days before the custody hearing
if written request has been made for inspection, whereas Omo RFv. CoDE ANN.
§ 2317.39 (Page 1954) requires the court to notify the parties of the existence
of any report not less than 5 days before the court considers the report. The
second source of conflict arises from the fact that rule 75(D) has a cross-ex-
amination provision while § 2317.39 does not.
It may be possible to harmonize these statutes to avoid any conflict. If
the parties request a copy of the report in writing, they must be allowed such
a copy at least 7 days before the hearing and the opportunity to subject the
report's author to cross-examination at trial. If no request is made, they will
be notified of the report's existence 5 days before the hearing and allowed to
study the report in the file, the cross-examination requirement presumably hav-
ing been waived by the failure to request a written copy under rule 75(D).
It is doubtful, however, that the cross-examination requirement is thus abro-
gated by § 2317.39.
68. 2A J. SuTHBRLAND, STATUTEs AND STATUTORY CoNsTRuCIoN § 51.05
(4th ed. C. Sands 1972).
69. See note 43 supra.
70. OHio R. Crv. P. 75(A) provides: "These Rules of Civil Procedure
shall apply in actions for divorce, annulment, alimony and related proceedings,
with modifications or exceptions set forth in this rule."
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child custody proceedings. The contention that rule 75(D) controls
is further strengthened by a decision of the Cuyahoga County Court
of Appeals7' wherein the court adopted the "specific controls over
general" rule in holding that Ohio Revised Code section 2947.06,
calling for investigations by a probation official, would govern over
section 2317.39 with respect to procedural requirements because of
the more specific nature of section 2947.06. Thus, it is justifiable
to look solely to rule 75(D) for any limitations on the Woodruff
rule with respect to judicial use of divorce investigation reports.
The only provision of rule 75(D) that addresses itself even tan-
gentially to the evidentiary quandary surrounding the use of extra-
judicial reports is the cross-examination requirement.72 Nevertheless,
this brief reference is sufficient to establish what could arguably be
considered legislative acceptance of a Woodruff approach. Under
rule 75(D), the caseworker responsible for the report must be avail-
able for cross-examination if the report is filed with the court. No
mention is made of admissibility. Thus, the legislature gives a liti-
gant the opportunity to challenge the validity of a report available
to the court regardless of its evidentiary status. Rule 75(D), then,
indicates a legislative recognition of the increasingly nonadversarial
and informal nature of custody proceedings by allowing cross-
examination on matters not formally before the court.
This conclusion can be inferred from a pragmatic analysis as
well. For example, if a trial judge were to follow the procedure out-
lined in Bearner,73 and conscientiously apply the rules of evidence
to an investigator's report, reports would almost never achieve the
status of evidence. A judge would be incapable of accurately label-
ing any conclusion of the investigator "nonhearsay" where the inves-
tigator had spoken to third parties about the custody status of the
child. To mandate cross-examination on such a report, which is in-
evitably honeycombed with hearsay, impliedly recognizes less strin-
gent use of the rules of evidence in custody determination. Otherwise
there would be no point in giving the litigants a right to cross-
examine an investigator only if the report is formally admitted, since
admission is inconceivable under the rules of evidence as normally
applied. Thus it can be argued that the legislature has impliedly
recognized the informal nature of custodial proceedings originally
acknowledged by the judiciary in Woodruff.
71. State v. Smith, 29 Ohio App. 2d 241, 281 N.E.2d 17 (1972).
72. See note 7 supra.
73. See notes 59-61 supra and accompanying text.
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V. A PROPOSAL
The evidentiary issue, significant in itself, is symptomatic of a
larger problem. The greater controversy concerns the courts' ability
to make a legal determination of what is essentially a psychological
question. The incongruity of placing sociopsychological decisions in
the hands of those with legal training has been much discussed in
recent years74 and is well illustrated by the statement of a leading
legal commentator in the field of child custody, whose approach to
the situation is the strongest argument for removing custody decisions
from the courtroom:
If the courts are to do a better job in custody matters it is
essential that such cases 'be referred to judges who have
some knowledge of behavioral science and who are recep-
tive to expert testimony and the recommendations of spe-
cialists. In this connection, it is tragic that the literature of
psychiatry and psychology has relatively little to offer as a
direct aid to a specific decision.7 5
This comment, in spite of its meritorious intention, epitomizes the
misconception that has allowed those untrained in behavorial science
to bear a responsibility they are not equipped to fulfill. 7 6 The prob-
74. See, e.g., BEYoND THm BEST INTERESTS, supra note 2; Foster, supra note
3; Watson, supra note 2; Westman, The Psychiatrist and Child Custody Con-
test, 127 AM. J. PSYCHATRY 1687 (1971).
75. Foster, supra note 3, at 3.
76. Some judges have openly recognized the invaluable aid other profes-
sionals may provide to those untrained in the interpersonal sciences. For ex-
ample, Family Court Judge Gilbert Ramirez of New York has stated in a re-
cent interview:
The most important single individual in these cases is a psychiatrist.
The ideal thing would be to have a group headed by a psychiatrist in-
tervene in all these cases and have this group interview the mother,
speak with the father, examine the child, and speak with anybody else
connected with this picture. The group, consisting of the psychiatrist
and perhaps a social worker or people in other related fields, should
submit to the court a comprehensive report with recommendations as
to custody and plan of visitation.
Milgrim, The Adolescent in Relation to His Separated Yet Inseparable Parents,
in CHILDREN OF SEPARATION AND DivoRcE 37, 45 (I. Stuart & L. Abt eds. 1972).
See also, Foster, supra note 3, at 3.
Recent studies indicate that attorneys, who act as officers of the court and
provide the main source of information to the judge, are usually minimally
trained in the behavioral sciences. A 1965 study of randomly selected attor-
neys revealed that of 60 respondents, 55 had taken only one college-level
course in psychology, and five had taken no formal course in psychology what-
soever. Seizer & Benedek, Lawyers' Use of Psychiatry, 122 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
212 (1965). Another study reveals that even where the attorney is sensitive
to the psychological tensions in his client and is aware of his duty to represent
the best interests of the children involved "the undercurrents of commitment
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lem is not the lack of literature that might aid specific decisions, 'but
rather the distorted notion that psychological -principles can be
treated as rules of law. The literature is replete with texts and re-
search articles on the emotional conflicts created by divorce and its
effect upon children. 77 These articles are of value, however, only
to those trained to comprehend them. To wait for literature that
can be a "direct aid in a specific decision" is unrealistic, since any
attempt to make complex psychological principles understandable to
laymen is bound to result in oversimplification.
The children of divorce defy easy categorization because child-
ren's behavior is inherently variable. 8 Moreover, the psychological
world of the child is not easily analogized to the world of the adult.79
Furthermore, even if it were assumed that objective manifestations
could be categorized, that these categories consistently presaged a
specific result, and that laymen could be trained to recognize these
categories (all of which is open to serious question), the existing
courtroom environment and personnel do not lend themselves to de-
velopment of such a decisionmaking process. A similar conclusion
was reached by Dr. Andrew Watson, professor of psychiatry and law
at the University of Michigan. 80  In suggesting an answer to the
question "whether or not the adversary proceeding distorts the infor-
mation utilized to make the custodial decision," 8' Dr. Watson set
forth several reasons compelling an affirmative answer, not the least
of which was the courts' lack of understanding about the develop-
ment of children.8 2
The conclusion is inescapable that the present system cannot ful-
fill the statutory duty of protecting the best interests of the child,83
to one parent or to the other militate against actually achieving this." West-
man, supra note 74, at 1687. See also DESPERT 185-213.
77. See, e.g., BEYOND a BEST INTERESTS, supra note 2; DESPERT; W.
GOODE, AFTER DIVORCE (1956); B. STEINZOK, WHEN PARENTS DIVORCE
(1969); Benedek, Child Custody Laws: Their Psychiatric Implications, 129
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 326 (1972); Cline & Westman, The Impact of Divorce on
the Family, 2 CHILD PSYCHOLOGY & HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 78 (1971); Landis,
The Trauma of Children When Parents Divorce, 22 MARRIAGE & FAMILY LIVING
7 (1960).
78. D. FnisKp & S. MADDI, FUNCTIONS OF VARIED EXPERIENCE 326-54
(1961); INDIvIDuAL DIFFERENCES IN CHILDREN (J. Westman ed. 1973).
79. BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 2, at 9-28.
80. Watson, supra note 2.
81. Id. at 58.
82. Id. at 58-62. Other reasons given for this distortion include imbal-
ances in the advocacy powers of counsel and the exaggeration and distortion
of facts occurring when they are removed from strict family context. Id.
83. OHIO R. Civ. P. 75(P) provides: "Upon hearing, the court shall de-
cide which of the parents shall have the care, custody and control of the chil-
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although the solutions offered 'by Dr. Watson could operate to miti-
gate the effects of the courtroom on the custodial determination. One
suggestion, for example, was to move custodial procedures into
"chambers." 84  Though the merits of the suggestion cannot be
doubted, one is tempted to ask why a courtroom should be used in
the first place if the first order of business is to leave the courtroom.
Another suggestion was to "modify the judiciary" and "appoint beha-
vorial science 'judges' to sit with the divorce court judge when he
is hearing a case involving child custody."8s 5 Once again the merits
of the suggestion are -unassailable, but one must ask why it would
not be preferable simply to give the full responsibility to psychiatrists
and psychologists themselves. The most forceful suggestion made
by Dr. Watson in response to this question was to adopt the com-
mittee notion of Professor Kubie, 88 in which a group of behavioral
scientists is formed to handle the urgent problems, both legal and
psychological, of each child of divorce.8 7 A somewhat more practi-
cal adaption of the suggestion would 'be to form an agency composed
entirely of such committees, each with its own caseload. Their deci-
sions could be automatically enforced by the courts.
It is -unrealistic, however, to expect legislators to acquiesce in
such plans.8 8 This is particularly so at this time in Ohio, when the
General Assembly has recently expressed its doubt about the sacrifi-
ces that have to be made to produce quality child custody reports.8 9
The burden then falls on the courts to assure that adequate informa-
tion is made available for a proper child custody determination.
The courts too, however, seem unprepared to assimilate such in-
novations in the light of the nascent rule, adopted by two lower
courts to date,90 which prohibits a court from relying solely upon an
investigation report as a basis for its decision. This reluctance to
give controlling weight to investigation reports is difficult to under-
stand, since -the report does not even contain a recommendation. It
only presents facts and relates the results of interviews. Perhaps it
dren, taking into account only that which would be for the best interests of
each child."
84. Id. at 78-79.
85. Id. at 79.
86. See note 2 supra.
87. Watson, supra note 2, at 79-80.
88. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
89. See text accompanying notes 20-41 supra.
90. Hillard v. Hillard, 29 Ohio App. 2d 20, 277 N.E.2d 557 (1971);
Woodruff v. Woodruff, 36 Ohio Op. 2d 165, 217 N.E.2d 264 .(C.P. Miami
County 1965).
DIVORCE INVESTIGATION REPORTS
is the lack of;specialized training of the investigators that alienates
the courts. The caseworkers in Cuyahoga County, for example, are
not required to have college degrees. 91 Although degrees do not
necessarily reflect sensitivity and intelligence in collecting data, if in-
vestigation reports are to mature into well-documented studies, their
authors must have training in the area of psychology.
A court-initiated renovation of the present system is required to
bring Ohio's custody determination procedure to a point where it can
begin to aid the court in fulfilling its statutory duty. 92 First, Ohio's
courts must make full use of their discretionary investigative power
in both contested and uncontested cases. As indicated previously,
it is debatable whether mandatory investigations should have been
repealed at all. 93 - The damage is done however; it is now the duty
of the courts to act to prevent mistakes through extensive use of dis-
cretionary investigations. In addition, the lack of judicial expertise
for making what is essentially a psychological determination renders
extra-judicial reports not only useful but necessary. The sole sub-
stantive drawback in relying heavily upon these reports, the unpro-
fessional training of the investigator, can be remedied by setting up
a standing committee of investigators trained fuliy in the behavioral
sciences. Once such a committee is established, it could produce a
high-quality report at moderate cost and in a minimum period of
time and expense.
Once the courts have committed themselves to producing de-
pendable divorce investigation reports, the only obstacle to their
use would be the restrictive evidentiary rules that limit their avail-
ability at trial. Therefore, the courts should adopt the informal pro-
cedure employed in Woodruff, which admits the reports into evi-
dence if they contain relevant information.9" Finally, the courts
should give presumptive weight to the conclusions of the report. This
step would indicate the willingness of the courts to recognize the ex-
pertise of others and would lead to a more satisfactory initial custo-
dial determination. It would at the same time leave the court the
opportunity to consider countervailing considerations brought out
through testimony at trial, which could effectively rebut the presump-
tion raised by the report.
These suggestions envision no changes in the present in-court per-
91. Williams Interview.
92. OmIo R. Crv. P. 75(P).
93. See text accompanying notes 20-41 supra.
94. See text following note 63 supra.
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sonnel. Thus, the suggestion would not have to await any legislative
action, for it is presently within the power of family court judges to
appoint appropriate personnel to examine children and their environ-
ments 'before making final decisions. 95 The only potential impedi-
ment to the system is the language in section 3109.04, which states
"that the court shall decide" custody.96 Two courts to date have
held that this statute means that the court must make the choice per-
sonally; that is, the court cannot delegate its power to make the deci-
sion even to the extent of relying solely on an investigation report
to render its decision.97  However, 'by establishing a presumption
in favor of the report's conclusions, the court would not delegate its
decisionmaking power to the investigators. If the presumption is
rebutted, the court must ultimately make the determination of which
party's evidence is more convincing. If the presumption stands, the
court still has decided the case 'by means of a rule previously deter-
mined by it to be reliable.
GEORGE KARL RosENSTOCK
95. Owo R. Civ. P. 75(D), (P).
96. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.04 (Page 1972).
97. See text accompanying note 90 supra.
